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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Spencer Newell Breese appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to 
suppress.  He contends the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress 
because the person who conducted the search of his backpack was acting as a 
government agent, not a private party, and because the search was not supported by 
probable cause, and thus did not fall within the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
   
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 On April 28, 2015, Mr. Breese was traveling on a Greyhound bus from Portland, 
Oregon, to Salt Lake City, Utah, when the bus made a scheduled stop in Boise.  
(Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.17, L.4.)  A Greyhound employee, Ward Eversull, contacted the 
Boise Police Department to advise that as he was rearranging luggage in the 
compartments underneath the bus, he found a backpack that had a strong odor of 
marijuana.  (Tr., p.18, Ls.7-16, p.26, Ls.3-5.)  Mr. Eversull requested assistance from 
Officer Wall and his drug dog.  (Tr., p.18, L.22 – p.19, L.3.)   
Boise Police Officer Kent Lipple arrived at the bus terminal in response to 
Mr. Eversull’s call, and Mr. Eversull showed Officer Lipple the suspect backpack, which 
he had placed in a different compartment.  (Tr., p.20, Ls.5-8.)  Officer Lipple said, “I 
don’t smell it.”  Mr. Eversull felt the outside of the bag and said, “I feel something right 
here.”  (Tr., p.28, Ls.4-16.)  Officer Lipple asked, “You can still smell it?”  Mr. Eversull 
responded, stating he “just found it”—he “got [his] hands on it.”  Mr. Eversull opened the 
backpack in the presence of Officer Lipple and found three plastic bags containing a 
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green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana.  (Tr., p.21, L.19 – p.23, L.1.)  The 
backpack had a tag on it identifying Mr. Breese as its owner.  (Tr., p.22, Ls.8-11.)  
Mr. Breese was paged through the public address system at the bus terminal.  
(Tr., p.22, Ls.12-18.)  Mr. Breese identified the backpack as his, admitted the backpack 
contained marijuana, and was arrested.  (Tr., p.24, Ls.16-20.)       
Mr. Breese was charged by Information with one count of trafficking in marijuana.  
(R., pp.18-19.)  He filed a motion to suppress challenging the search of his backpack as 
unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.1  (R., pp.24-25, 28-39.)  The State filed a 
memorandum in opposition to Mr. Breese’s motion.  (R., pp.49-59.)  The district court 
held a hearing on Mr. Breese’s motion, at which Mr. Eversull testified for the State and 
the district court admitted into evidence an audio recording of the interaction between 
Mr. Eversull and Officer Lipple at the bus terminal.2  (R., pp.60-63; Tr. p.6, Ls1-7; Mot. 
to Augment, Ex. A., 3:37:15-3:41:47.)  Following the hearing, the parties submitted 
supplemental briefs to the district court.  (R., pp.64-66, 67-74.)   
On August 27, 2015, the district court issued a memorandum decision and order 
denying Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.76-87.)  Mr. Breese subsequently pled 
guilty to trafficking in marijuana, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to 
suppress.  (R., pp.90, 95.)  The district court sentenced Mr. Breese to one year fixed,
                                            
1 Mr. Breese also argued that he was questioned without being advised of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  (R., pp.34-35.)  Counsel for 
Mr. Breese abandoned this issue at the suppression hearing.  (Tr., p.6, Ls.1-2.) 
2 The Clerk’s Record does not contain a copy of this audio recording.  Simultaneously 
with the filing of this Brief, Mr. Breese is filing a Motion to Augment to include in the 
Record a copy of the audio recording of the hearing on Mr. Breese’s motion to 
suppress, during which counsel for Mr. Breese played the relevant portion of the audio 
recording of the interaction between Mr. Eversull and Officer Lipple. 
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the mandatory minimum, and imposed a $5,000 fine.  See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(1)(A).  
(R., p.99.)  The judgment was entered on November 3, 2015, and Mr. Breese filed a 
timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.100-04, 109-11.)  
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Breese’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
The district court denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress because it concluded 
that Mr. Eversull was not acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s 
backpack, and the search thus did not implicate Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.  (R., pp.79-83.)  The district court also concluded that even if Mr. Eversull 
was acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s backpack, the 
search was authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement 
because it was supported by probable cause.  (R., pp.83-86.)  The district court erred in 
both respects.  Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent when he searched 
Mr. Breese’s backpack because Officer Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search, 
and because Mr. Eversull’s intent was to assist law enforcement.  Further, the search of 
Mr. Breese’s backpack was not authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the 
warrant requirement because Mr. Eversull’s alleged detection of an odor of marijuana 
did not provide probable cause for the search.  The district court thus erred in denying 
Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress.  State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012).  The Court will accept 
the trial court’s findings of fact “unless they are clearly erroneous.”  State v. Wulff, 157 
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Idaho 416, 418 (2014).  However, the Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s 
application of constitutional principles to the facts found.”  Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
 
C. The Search of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Implicated His Rights Under The Fourth 
Amendment Because The Greyhound Employee Who Conducted The Search 
Was Acting As A Government Agent, Not A Private Party 
 
The district court denied Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress because it concluded 
that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent, not a private party, when he 
conducted the search, and the search thus did not implicate Mr. Breese’s rights under 
the Fourth Amendment.  (R., pp.79-83.)  The district court is correct that a search by a 
private party does not implicate the Fourth Amendment; however, it is clear under 
established precedent that Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of 
the search, and the search thus implicates Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
“It is firmly established that evidence obtained through a private search, even 
though wrongfully conducted, is not excludable under the fourth amendment unless 
government officials instigated the search or otherwise participated in a wrongful 
search.”  State v. Kopsa, 126 Idaho 512, 517 (Ct. App. 1994) (citations omitted).  
“However, where a private party acts as an instrument or agent of the state in effecting 
a search or seizure, fourth amendment interests are implicated.”  Id. (citation omitted).  
“The burden of proving governmental involvement in a search conducted by a private 
citizen rests on the party objecting to the evidence.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
This case falls within the “grey area” between the extremes of overt 
governmental participation in a search and the complete absence of such participation.  
See id.; see also United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1994).  Cases such 
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as this one must be resolved on a “case-by-case basis.”  See Kopsa, 126 Idaho at 51.  
“In analyzing whether the person conducting the search is acting as a government 
agent, two critical factors must be considered:  (1) government knowledge and 
acquiescence, and (2) the private party’s intent in making the search.”  Id. (citation 
omitted); see also Reed, 15 F.3d at 931. 
The search of Mr. Breese’s backpack meets the first of these two requirements—
government knowledge and acquiescence—because Officer Lipple knew of and 
acquiesced in the search.  Officer Lipple was personally present during the search and 
knew exactly what Mr. Eversull was doing as he was doing it.  See Reed, 15 F.3d at 
931 (concluding search of defendant’s hotel room “obviously met” the first requirement 
where, among other things, two police officers “were personally present during the 
search, [and] knew exactly what [the hotel employee] was doing as he was doing it”).   
The district court concluded that Officer Lipple did not acquiesce in the search 
because his participation “was minimal.”  (R., p.81.)  The district court explained, 
“Although Eversull vocalized his findings as he searched the backpack, at no time did 
Cpl. Lipple direct or encourage Eversull to search the backpack or touch the backpack 
himself.”  (R., p.82.)  To acquiesce is “to accept, comply or submit tacitly or passively.”  
See Merriam Webster’s Online Dictionary, at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/acquiescing (last visited 2/5/16); see also State v. Glushko, 266 
P.3d 50, 58 (Or. 2011) (quoting dictionary definition of “acquiescence” as “silent or 
passive assent to, or compliance with, proposals or measures”); United States v. 
Marchesano, 67 M.J. 535, 543 (Army Ct. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting dictionary definition 
of “acquiesce” as “to accept tacitly or passively; to give implied consent to an act” and 
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noting that active participation or engagement is not required); Aguilar Gonzalez v. 
Mukasey, 534 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (9th Cir. 2008) (Smith, dissenting) (quoting dictionary 
definition of “acquiescence” as “[a] person’s tacit or passive acceptance” or “implied 
consent to an act”).  Officer Lipple acquiesced in the search even though his 
participation was minimal and he neither directed nor encouraged it, because he 
accepted the search and allowed it to happen.  That is sufficient for acquiescence.  
The next factor to consider is Mr. Eversull’s intent in making the search—
specifically, whether he intended to further his own ends or to assist law enforcement 
efforts.  See Reed, 15 F.3d at 931.  The district court concluded that Mr. Eversull’s 
reasons for doing the search “were entirely personal” because his “primary motivation 
for conducting the search was to pursue Greyhound’s interest in deterring the 
transportation of illegal or dangerous substances.”  (R., pp.82-83.)  This conclusion is 
contradicted by Mr. Eversull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.   
At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor asked Mr. Eversull, “Why do you 
prefer to have law enforcement present when you believe luggage contains controlled 
substances?”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.17-19.)  Mr. Eversull responded, “Because I never know 
what the quantities are going to be.”  (Tr., p.18, Ls.20-21.)  The district court followed up 
on this question with Mr. Breese: 
The Court: Help me understand why it is you wanted law enforcement 
there when you opened the bag that you were concerned 
about. 
 
[Mr. Breese]: One, I’m never sure what the quantity is and I’m not—don’t 
know that the legal—I know it’s illegal as a substance.  I’m 
not sure when I’m smelling it in a bag what the quantity is. 
 
The Court:  Does the quantity make a difference in terms of whether or 
not—what Greyhound is going to do? 
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[Mr. Breese]: No, it would be a difference on what the policy on what the 
law enforcement is going to do with it. 
 
(Tr., p.37, L.16 – p.38, L.3.)   
It is clear from this testimony that Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement 
efforts in searching Mr. Breese’s backpack.  Mr. Eversull wanted law enforcement 
present for the search because he did not know “what the quantities are going to be” 
and the quantity made a difference “on what the law enforcement is going to do with it.”  
The district court stated in its memorandum decision that Mr. Eversull “expressed 
discomfort, as a private citizen, with potentially being in possession of a large amount of 
contraband.”  (R., p.83.)  This is pure speculation.  Mr. Eversull never expressed 
discomfort with being in possession of a large quantity of contraband—instead, he 
expressed an intent to assist law enforcement.     
In United States v. Gomez, 614 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1979), the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals held that an airline employee’s search of a suitcase which had apparently 
been misplaced was a private search even though a county detective physically carried 
the suitcase to the employee’s working area because the airline had a legitimate 
interest in identifying the owner of the luggage.  Similarly, in United States v. Humphrey, 
549 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977), the Ninth Circuit held that an airline employee’s search of 
an obviously damaged package was a private search even though a police officer had 
suggested it might be a “good idea” to open the package because the airline had a 
legitimate interest in preventing fraudulent loss claims.  In Gomez and Humphrey, there 
was no indication (and certainly no testimony) that the employees who conducted the 
respective searches intended to assist law enforcement.  Here, it is clear that 
Mr. Eversull wanted to assist law enforcement in conducting the search of Mr. Breese’s 
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backpack. He wanted a police officer present to determine the amount of marijuana so 
that the officer could determine “what . . . to do with it.”  (Tr., p.38, Ls.1-3.)     
 Because Officer Lipple knew of and acquiesced in the search of Mr. Breese’s 
backpack, and because Mr. Eversull intended to assist law enforcement in conducting 
the search, Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent at the time of the search.  
The search thus implicated Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment and, as 
discussed below, violated those rights because it was not supported by probable cause. 
 
D. The Search Of Mr. Breese’s Backpack Was Not Authorized Pursuant To The 
Automobile Exception To The Warrant Requirement Because It Was Not 
Supported By Probable Cause 
 
In denying Mr. Breese’s motion to suppress, the district court held that even if 
Mr. Eversull was acting as a government agent when he searched Mr. Breese’s 
backpack, the search did not violate Mr. Breese’s rights under the Fourth Amendment 
because it “was authorized pursuant to the automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement.”  (R., p.83.)  Contrary to the district court’s conclusion, the warrantless 
search of Mr. Breese’s backpack was not authorized pursuant to the automobile 
exception to the warrant requirement because it was not supported by probable cause.  
Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a warrant is not 
required to search a vehicle “when there is probable cause to conclude that the vehicle 
contains evidence of a crime, and exigent circumstances exist due to the vehicle’s 
mobility and likelihood the evidence may be lost or destroyed.”  State v. Gonzales, 117 
Idaho 518, 519 (1990).  The district court concluded that the search of Mr. Breese’s 
backpack was supported by probable cause because Mr. Eversull smelled marijuana 
emanating from the backpack.  The fact that Mr. Eversull allegedly smelled marijuana 
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did not establish probable cause for the search because Mr. Eversull was not trained in 
drug detection and because Officer Lipple did not detect an odor of marijuana.   
In Gonzales, this Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s 
motion to suppress where the defendant “[did not] dispute the district court’s finding that 
the officer was trained to recognize by smell the presence of ‘raw marijuana.’”  117 
Idaho at 519.  The Gonzales Court reasoned that “[a]n officer may draw reasonable 
inferences to establish probable cause from related experience and law enforcement 
training.”  Id.  Gonzales thus stands for the proposition that probable cause for a search 
exists when a trained officer detects the smell of marijuana.  The present case is clearly 
distinguishable from Gonzales because the person who allegedly smelled marijuana—
Mr. Eversull—was neither trained in drug detection nor a police officer, and the police 
officer on scene, who presumably was trained in drug detection, did not smell 
marijuana.       
The district court apparently believed that Mr. Eversull’s sense of smell was 
sufficiently reliable to support a finding of probable cause.  The district court stated in its 
memorandum decision that Mr. Eversull had “significant past experience with marijuana 
detection” because “[o]n ‘several’ occasions over the past few years, his identification of 
marijuana by odor alone has been successfully confirmed by either law enforcement 
searches or his own searches.”  (R., p.11.)  This is not an accurate characterization of 
Mr. Eversull’s testimony and overstates his qualifications. 
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Eversull testified that he had worked for 
Greyhound for over ten years.  (Tr., p.8, Ls.14-15.)  He was asked on direct, “Is this 
[smell of marijuana] a smell that you have reported to law enforcement in the past?”  He 
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answered, “Several times in the past, yes.”  (Tr., p.17, Ls.23-25.)  Mr. Eversull did not 
indicate the number of times he had reported a smell of marijuana to law enforcement; 
nor did he indicate how many times his reports had turned out to be true, and how many 
times, if any, they had turned out to be false.  The district court asked Mr. Eversull about 
his experience recognizing the smell of marijuana, but the exchange was brief: 
Q. How did you recognize it as the odor of marijuana? 
 
A. Because marijuana has a very distinct odor to it. 
 
Q. How are you familiar with the odor of marijuana? 
 
A. I grew up – 
 
(Tr., p.34, Ls.17-22.)  At this point, the prosecutor requested that the district court 
advise Mr. Eversull of his privilege against self-incrimination.  (Tr., p.34, L.23 – p.34, 
L.2.)  The district court responded that it did not want to “open a can of worms that 
doesn’t need to be opened” and withdrew its question.  (Tr., p.35, Ls.3-7.)  The following 
exchange then took place on redirect: 
Q. In your line of work you indicated that you’ve called law 
enforcement on previous occasions related to controlled 
substances; is that correct? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. And when you have called law enforcement, have you ever in the 
past suspected an odor to be that of marijuana? 
 
A. That wasn’t marijuana? 
 
Q. No.  Let me rephrase the question.  Have you ever called law 
enforcement believing to have smelled marijuana in a bag? 
 
A. Yes. 
 
Q. Have you been present for law enforcement searching the bag that 
you believed contained marijuana? 
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A. Yes. 
 
Q. And on prior occasions, has your suspicion that a bag smells like 
marijuana been confirmed by law enforcement using a dog or you 
yourself searching and finding marijuana? 
 
A. Yes to both questions. 
 
Q. And . . . [d]id it smell to you on the 28th as it had in previously [sic] 
instances where you had called law enforcement based on the 
smell? 
 
A. Yes, it has a very distinctive odor to it. 
 
(Tr., p.19, L.15 – p.20, L.16.)   
 It is clear from Mr. Eversull’s testimony, quoted above, that Mr. Eversull has 
some experience detecting marijuana in luggage.  But it is not accurate to characterize 
his experience as “significant,” as the district court did.  (R., p.11.)  We have no 
indication how many times Mr. Eversull has detected marijuana over the course of his 
ten-year career.  It does not appear that Mr. Eversull has ever received training in drug 
detection, and it is unclear whether he is aware of the distinction between raw and 
burned marijuana.  These facts alone distinguish this case from those relied upon by the 
district court.  See United States v. Pond, 523 F.2d 210, 211 (2d Cir. 1975) (affirming 
denial of motion to suppress where officer obtained search warrant from an affidavit 
based on station agent’s report of the odor of marijuana in checked luggage, where the 
station agent “had accurately detected marijuana using his sense of smell as a 
determining clue in approximately half of 25 to 30 cases in which he had provided 
information to federal authorities”); State v. Vonhof, 751 P.2d 1221, 1225-26 (Wash. 
App. 1988) (finding no abuse of discretion in magistrate’s issuance of search warrant 
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where affiant “specifically described the odor [of growing marijuana], and . . . stated he 
had smelled mature or growing marijuana at least 10 times before”).    
 More importantly, the district court’s conclusion that Mr. Eversull’s alleged 
detection of the odor of marijuana was sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause for 
the search of Mr. Breese’s backpack does not account for Officer Lipple’s testimony that 
he did not detect an odor of marijuana.  (Mot. to Augment, Ex. A., 3:38:39-3:39:25.)  
None of the cases relied upon by the district court suggest that probable cause exists 
where a non-police officer allegedly detects an odor of marijuana, but a trained police 
officer does not.  The district court addressed this point in a footnote, but its reasoning is 
unpersuasive.  The court stated:  
The fact that Cpl. Lipple could not smell the marijuana when he arrived on 
scene does not affect this Court’s conclusion regarding probable cause.  
Namely, when Eversull initially smelled the marijuana, the backpack had 
been confined in a closed compartment for several hours, rending [sic] the 
odor more pungent.  When Cpl. Lipple arrived, the compartment had been 
opened and the backpack moved to the top of a pile of baggage in a new 
bin, thus exposed to open air which would have allowed the odor to 
dissipate.  Indeed, having smelled marijuana emanating from the 
compartment when Eversull first opened it, his report to law enforcement 
gave probable cause to search all of the containers on the bus that could 
contain marijuana, not just the one from which Eversull believed the smell 
was emanating. 
 
(R., p.86.)  It cannot be the case that a court can simply credit the report of an untrained 
citizen over the report of a trained police officer to find probable cause.  In the context of 
the detection of the odor of marijuana, training is significant.  Indeed, at least one court 
has held that a police officer who had some training in drug detection did not have 
enough training to detect the odor of raw marijuana.  See State v. Holley, 899 N.E.2d 
31, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (affirming grant of defendant’s motion to suppress where the 
officer in question “testified that he had attended [only] one seminar where he was 
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shown what raw marijuana looked like” and “[t]here was no evidence that [the officer] 
had any formal training regarding the detection of raw marijuana by odor”).   
“Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances known to 
the officer at the time of the search would give rise—in the mind of a reasonable 
person—to a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place.”  State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012).  A reasonable person 
would not conclude that a person who was not a police officer and was not trained in 
drug detection would be able to detect marijuana in a closed backpack, when a police 
officer who presumably was trained in drug detection could detect no such odor.  On the 
record presented, the district court erred in concluding that the search of Mr. Breese’s 
backpack was supported by probable cause, and thus erred in concluding the search 
was permissible under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Breese respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction, reverse the 
district court’s order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
 DATED this 7th day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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